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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G. DALE FlAKE and CYNTHIA 
R. FLAKE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs 
DUANE A. FRANDSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELlANT Is BRIEF 
case No. 15309 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TEE CASE 
This is a civil case wherein the Appellant appeals the 
granting of Respondents' Motion for summary Judgment, and also 
appeals the denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came before the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge 
of the seventh Judicial District court for carbon county on 
Respondents' and Appellant's Motions for summary Judgment on 
May 31, 1977. The court granted Respondents' Motion and in 
doing so denied Appellant's Motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks the reversal of the lower court's action 
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in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, and as:-, 
this court to order the Court below to grant Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Appellant has a valid common law retaining lien on the 
water stock in question because he rendered professional 
services for which he was not compensated, and he gained 
possession of the stock in the course of providing profession, 
services. 
Appellant also has a statutory charging lien on the wate: 
stock by virtue of his compliance with Utah Code Anno., Sec. 
78-51-41 (1953 as amended), which provides for an attorney's 
lien upon a Judgment procured in his client's favor and the 
proceeds of the Judgment. 
Thirdly, Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment should 
have been granted because Respondents failed to comply with 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which re-
quires that a party must object to a Motion for summary Jud~ 
by filing responses to it, in order to prevent the Motion frc; 
being granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Early in 1974 Appellant's clients, Maurice and Evie May 
L'Heureux, sued Ray and Maribelle Wareham over a dispute 
regarding a Sales contract wherein Appellant's clients were 
purchasers and Warehams were sellers. The certificate of 
water stock at issue in the present case was among the pro~r 
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at issue in the Wareham suit. Jud gment was granted in favor 
of wareham by Seventh Judicial District court Judge Edward 
Sheya, but later a Motion for a New Trial was granted. Before 
the new trial was heard, the parties negotiated a settlement, 
and Judgment was entered on December 20, 1974, in accordance 
with the terms of the settlement. That Judgment ordered 
Appellant's clients to deliver to the warehams $13,481.21 
plus interest, and also ordered warehams to deliver the sub-
ject water stock, which Wareham delivered to Appellant as 
attorney in the case. Appellant's clients did not pay for the 
Appellant's services in the Wareham suit, and Appellant re-
tained possession of the water stock certificate asserting an 
attorney's lien until payment of Appellant's fee of $3,000.05. 
Appellant's clients then sold the farm which they had 
bought from warehams to Respondents in this action. Included 
in this sale was the water stock which Appellant still held 
in his possession under an attorney's lien pending compensation 
for legal services rendered during the Wareham suit. 
Appellant's clients moved to Missouri and have not paid 
him for his legal services. Respondents later sold the sub-
ject water stock to Utah Power and Light Company. Utah Power 
and Light paid for the stock and then demanded possession. 
Appellant declined to deliver the stock to Utah Power 
and Light, and has at all times maintained possession of it 
and asserted an attorney's lien pending payment for legal 
services rendered. 
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Respondents filed suit against Ap 11 t pe an on January 7, 
1977, seeking to compel delivery of the stock. Appellant 
moved to dismiss on the ground that Respondents were not real 
parties in interest as required by Rule 17(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, having sold the stock t 
o Utah PO\oier 
and Light, and having been paid therefore. The Motion was 
denied. 
Appellant then filed an Answer alleging that Respondents 
were not real parties in interest, that Respondents had failec 
to join Appellant's former clients as indispensible parties, 
and asserting an attorney's lien on the stock. On April 25, 
1977, Respondent moved for Summary Judgment and filed a sup~~ 
ing affidavit. 
On May 6, 1977, Appellant filed an objection to Respondet[ 
Motion for Summary Judgment as required by Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and also moved for Summary 
Judgment in his favor, with a supporting affidavit. Responden: 
did not file any counter-affidavits and did not respond to 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, other than by oral 
argument at the hearing. 
on June 2, 1977, the lower court granted Respondents' 
Motion for summary Judgment, and in so doing denied Appellant. 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant now petitions the Uta:. 
supreme court to reverse the lower court and order the granti~· 
of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
i 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT l 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING 
RESPONDE.tr.;S' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING~ 
APPELlANT S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE NO 
MATERIAL FACT WAS AT ISSUE AS TO APPELLANT's COMMC>N IAW 
RETAINING LIEN ON THE WATER STOCK CERTIFICATE IN HIS 
POSSESSION. 
It is well established within the law that attorney's 
liens are divided into retaining liens, founded upon possession, 
and charging liens, founded upon a Judgment. It is stated 
in 3 A.L.R. 2d at page 148: 
"Attorneys' liens are divided, according to their nature, 
into two classes: (l) general, possessory, or retaining 
liensr and (2) charging or special liens. The forme~. 
which is generally a common law lien, attaches to all 
property, papers, books, documents, securities, and moneys 
of the client coming into the hands of the attorney in 
the course of his professional employment, and gives him 
the right to retain possession thereof as security for 
costs, disbursements, and charges not only in the par-
ticular cause in which they come into his possession, but 
for all costs, disbursements, and charges due him for 
other professional employment and business. This lien 
is, however, generally speaking, a passive one, and cannot 
ordinarily be actively enforced either at law or in equity. 
The special or charging lien, on the other hand, which 
is one given to the attorney for his services rendered 
in procuring a Judgment, Decree, or award for his client, 
may be actively enforced in appropriate proceedings 
therefore." 
It is clear then that for a retaining lien to exist the 
client must owe the attorney for legal services or other bus-
iness charges and the attorney must have in his possession 
some "property, papers, documents, securities" etc. which belong 
to the client, and which came into the attorney's possession 
in the course of professional employment. These tests are 
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plainly met in the instant case. Appellant provided valuable 
legal services for his client in the litigation wJ.'th 
Mr. & MJ:, 
'i'lareham and was not compensated therefore. And the subject 
water stock, belonging to the client, came into Appellant's 
possession in the course of professional employment, namely 
in accordance with the settlement and Judgment in the >vareh 
~
suit. 
The leading Utah case on retaining liens is Midvale Motor, 
--.......: 
Inc. vs Saunders 21 tJ;2d 181, 442 P. 2d 938 ( 1968) . In that cas; 
the plaintiff lost at the trial level, but on appeal Judgment 
was reversed. Thereafter difficulties developed between the 
plaintiff and its attorney and the attorney withdrew. The at. 
torney then asserted a charging lien on the files, pleadings 
and the property involved in the law suit pursuant to Utah coce( 
Anno. Sec. 78-51-41, 1953 as amended. In holding that no 
chargL~g lien existed because the attorney had not procured 
a Judgment in his client's favor as required by the statute, 
the Utah Supreme Court '"'as careful to point out that a retain· 
ing lien may still exist even though the statutory requirements 
for a charging lien had not been met. 
Speaking for an unanimous court, Mr. Justice Ellett sta~ec 
"The court D:lelow). attempted to declare a lien when the 
statute tu.C.A. 78-51-413 gave none. If counsel was 
justified in withdrawing ~rom the.case he had a ;ammon 
law retaining lien and stJ.ll has J.t •.• but he nas no 
charging lien on plaintiff's property" . 442 P. 2d at 
940 {emphasis added) 
I 
Thus it is clear that Utah, like most states, has a commin 
law retaining lien separate from and independent of the statut 
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charging lien. The Court realized that to rule otherwise 
would be to hold that an attorney has no remedy at all against 
the client who refuses to compensate him for services rendered, 
unless a Judgment is obtained. Such a holding would leave 
the attorney defenseless with regard to services rendered 
other than in actual litigation. For many attorneys most of 
their time is spent in advising clients in matters which do 
not involve litigation or Judgments. Estate planning, advising 
businesses, conducting real estate transactions and drafting 
contracts are just a few of many examples of vital and frequent 
attorney functions which do not necessarily involve litigation 
and Judgments. The attorney certainly must have recourse to 
a retaining lien in these situations if a client fails to pay. 
In fact one of the very purposes of a retaining lien is to 
provide a remedy against unjust enrichment in those cases where 
a charging lien does not apply. 
It is equally clear that it is ~terial that someone 
other than the original client is seeking to deprive Appellant 
of his lien in this case. It is well settled in most juris-
dictions that the mere attempted transfer of rights in the 
subject property by the client to a third party cannot serve 
to extinquish retaining liens altogether because they are 
possessory in nature and all a client would have to do to defraud 
his attorney would be to sell or give the subject property 
away whenever the attorney sought reimbursement for valuable 
services. 
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~, 252 P. 834 (Okla. 1927). 
As early as 1927 Oklahoma faced th' ~s issue in ~ 
In that case an attorney ~s 
hired to recover 160 acres of ~is client's land. Before Judg. 
ment was rendered the client secretly compromised with the 
adverse party and conveyed the property to him. The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court held that the attorney retained his lien on the 
~
property for services rendered, dispite the attempted conve~~ 
Likewise, Appellant in the present case has a valid retain~g 
lien on the water stock which was not extinguished by Respond, 
purchase of the same. The lien continues until the attorney 
has given up possession or until he has been compensated for 
his services. 
It is also clear that the stock in question in this case 
is the type of property which is subject to a common law re· 
taining lien. It is stated in 3 A.L. R. 2d at p. 148 as quote( 
above that retaining liens attach to "all property, papers, 
books, documents, securities, and moneys corning into the i'lands 
of the attorney in the course of his professional employment," 
In 7 c.J.S. Attorney and Client Sec. 210 at 1141 it is stated 
that retaining liens are an attorney's right to retain posses· 
sian of "all documents, money, or other property of :'lis client 
coming into his hands professionally." 
While not distinguishing between a retaing lien and a 
1 ' 11 187 .o. ::34 (colo. l92C~ charging lien Clark et a vs 0 Donne , J 
is illustrative of the majority rule that such attorney's 
liens appiy not only to pleadings and other papers actoallY ~ 
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drafted by the attorney, but also t th 
o o er property, securities 
or certificates of stock belonging to t:1e client but in the 
possession of the attorney. In that case the attorney was 
retained to enforce a Sales Contract by which his client had 
bOught 700,000 shares of stock in the Mexico-wyoming Petroleum 
company. The attorney was successful and the court delivered 
the stock to the attorney for the sole purpose of transferring 
it to his client. Upon the client's refusal to compensate 
the attorney, the attorney asserted a lien and was upheld by 
the colorado Supreme court. 
Likewise, in the instant case, Appellant asserts a retain-
ing lien upon the water stock belonging to his client and which 
came into Appellant's possession in the course of professional 
employment, namely the stock certificate and other documents which 
were delivered upon the payment of the money to Narehai:IS in 
satisfaction of the Judgment in the Wareham case. 
Further it is well settled in Utah that a Motion for 
summary Judgment must be granted where the pleadings, even if 
proved, would not provide a basis for recovery. Rule 56(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part: 
"The Judgment sought shall be rendered fortlT..rith 1£ the 
pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatives, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to Summary 
Judgment as a matter of law." 
An analysis of the Respondents' pleadings shows that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact which would bar 
recovery under a retaining lien theory. The original complaint 
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merely alleges that the Respondents p h d 
urc ase the stock afte: 
it came into Appellant's possession as a result 
of the Juo'3lne 
ill the Wareham suit. Assuming such to be true, a 
common law 
retaining lien takes precedence over t' b 
ne su sequent purchaser 
as a matter of law. To preserve the attorney• s interest in t 
property in his possess ion is the very function of the rata~; 
lien. 
The affidavit in support of Respondents' Motion for 
Swmnary Judgment merely alleges that Respondents paid for the 
water stock, instructed Appellant to deliver possession, t~t 
Respondents desire to sell the stock, that Appellant was 
plaintiff • s attorney ill the Wareham suit and that there was n
1 
Judgment rendered in his clients' favor. Even if Respondents 
affidavit were to be taken as factually correct in all respec: 
Appellant would still be entitled to Summary Judgment as a 
matter of law because the common law retaining lien does not 
rest upon a Judgment. Appellant has a common law retaining 
lien in the water stock as long as he retains possession ~d 
remains unpaid for services he rendered to his client. 
POINT 2 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENTS ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
APPEL!AJ.'lT' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE NO 
MATERIAL FACT WAS AT ISSUE AS TO APPELlANT' S STATUTORY 
CHARGING LIEN ON TEE WATER STOCK CERTIFICATE IN HIS 
POSSESSION. 
At common law the attorney's special or charging lionl 
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an equitable right to have the fees d 
an costs due to him for 
services in a suit secured to him 
out of the Judgment or 
recovery in that particular suit. 
The lien is based on the principle f 
o equity that plain-
tiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a Judg-
ment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of 
his attorney in obtaining such Judgment. The charging lien 
binds the award or Judgment which has been obtained through 
the attorney's efforts, and prevents a client from receiving 
the fruits of his attorney's labors without compensating him 
for his services. 
For this common law charging lien to exist there must 
have been unpaid attorney's fees for legal services rendered 
in that particular cause of action, a Judgment, and appro-
priate notice. If these elements were present, a lien attached 
to the cause of action. However, this common law charging 
lien has been replaced by Utah Code Anno., Sec. 78-51-41 (1953 
as amended), which reads in full as follows: 
"The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his 
services is governed by agreement, express or implied, 
which is not restrained by law. From the commencement 
of an action, or the service of an Answer containing 
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party 
has a lien upon his client's cause of action or Counter-
cla~, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or 
Judgment in his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof 
in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected 
by any settlement between the parties before or after 
Judgment." 
Several things are clear from the above statutory lan-
guage. First, it is readily apparent tnat the statute only 
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applies to services performed in litigation. 
- ... The statute 
says, ''From commencement of an action, or the 
service of an 
Answer containing a Counterclaim, the attorney ... has a 
lien .• This language indicates that Utah, like most 
states, has codified its charging lien but remains silent as 
to the common law retaining lien. It is Ap 11 t' pe an S POSitior. 
that this statute does not exclude the other type of common 
law attorney's lien, namely the common law retaining lien. 
Second, the statute only protects plaintiff's attorneys, 
and defendant's attorneys who have filed Counterclaims. This 
further narrowing of the statutory charging lien argues even 
more strongly for the retention of the common law retaining 
lien to protect attorneys who represent clients in capacities 
other than in litigation or where the litigant is a defendant 
not asserting a Counterclaim. It is also clear that Appellan: 
is protected by the statute in spite of the narrow language 
because he represented the plaintiff in the Wareham suit. 
Third, the statutory charging lien attaches to "verdict, 
report, decision or -1\ldgment in his Ithe attorney' sl client's 
favor and the proceeds thereof." For the statute to apply 
the attorney must have obtained a Judgment in his client's 
favor. That Appellant did so here is clear. It is at this 
point that the present case diverges from tile Midvale Motors 
case, supra. In that case the plaintiff lost at the trial, 
and then the Judgment was reversed on appeal. It was immediat:1 
after that reversal that difficulties arose and the attorney j 
1 
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Withdrew from the case. The co rt u reasoned that the attorney 
had left his client as he had found him, with a lawsuit yet 
to be tried, and that therefore there was no Judgment to which 
a charging lien could attach. The relevant language from the 
court's opinion is as follows: 
"The statute t78-Sl-4ll gives a lien to the attorney 
on the fruits of his labor so as to protect him against 
an unjust enrichment on the part of a nonpaying client. 
It is not intended to give a general lien on any other 
assets of the client. If the attorney's work is sterile 
and produces no fruit, then he has no lien. Here counsel 
for plaintiff produced no fruit from his labor. He lost 
the case in the court below and then had to labor on an 
appeal to put his client back in status quo. When he 
withdrew from the case, he left the plaintiff practically 
as he found it, viz., with a lawsuit yet to be tried." 
442 P.2d at p. 940. 
contrast the Midvale Motors case with what happened in the 
present case. Here the court rendered a JUdgment against the 
plaintiff and then granted a Motion for a New Trial upon certain 
issues. If the scenario had stopped there, this case would have 
:oeen similar to Midvale Motors. But here Appellant took the 
additional step of negotiating a settlement to the satisfaction 
of his client which made the new trial unnecessary. The fruits 
of this settlement were included in the final Judgment, giving 
to the plaintiff, among other things, the water stock at issue 
here, in exchange for the stipulated price. 
Thus it is clear that Appellant went beyond the facts of 
Midvale Motors and obtained, by a successful Motion for N~w 
Trial and by favorable negotiation, a Judgment favorable in 
part to his client. The water stock is the fruit of that 
Judgment and as such is subject to a charging lien under the 
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Utah statute, as well as being subJ·ect to the 
common law 
retaining lien. That such a holding complies with the 
policy 
behind this statutory lien is also clear. 
Mr. Justice Ellett 
in the above quoted language illuminates that statutory 
Pur. 
pose. It is to protect the attorney against unjust enrichmen: 
on the part of the nonpaying client. As a direct result of 
Appellant's professional services, his client received title 
to certain land, livestock, and water stock at issue here. 
To allow the client to sell the proceeds of that Judgment 
without compensating Appellant for his legal services would 
clearly amount to unjust enrichment. 
The last phrase of the charging lien statute resolves 
another issue. The statute is unequivical in its affect on t:; 
present case, namely, that the lien continues in the stock, 1 
notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant's client attemptec I 
to transfer ownership. The language is as follows: 
1rhe~ lien. . • attaches to the proceeds !Of the Judgmentl 
in whosoever hands they may come. . . " The express mandate 0: 
the statute is that an attempted assignment or sale of the 
proceeds of a Judgment cannot defeat an attorney's charging ll! 
At common law appropriate notice was necessary, but the Utah 
Legislature saw fit to dispense with that requirement. This 
same conclusion has been reached by other state courts which 
have interpreted similar statutes. In Anderson vs Star-Bair 
Oil co. et al, 243 P. 394 (Wyo. 1926), the Wyoming court held i 
that an attorney's lien on a client's property in the attorney I 
l 
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tands was superio~ to the rights of 
an assignee, even without 
notice. 
In City of Los Angeles vs Knapp et al, 60 P.2d 127 (calif. 
1936) the California Court reached the same conclusion. In 
that case the city attempted to condemn certain property, and 
then abandoned the attempt. The Court awarded costs and 
attorney's fees to the defendant, who assigned his rights to 
a third party. Defendant's attorney later assigned his rights 
to another party, and the Court held that the interest of the 
attorney's assignee was superior to that of the client's 
assignee. 
The Arizona Court followed the same reasoning in Linder 
vs Lewis, Roca, Scoville and Beuchamp et al, 85 Ariz. 118, 
333 P.2d 286 (1958). The relevant facts are as follows: 
Louis Marches hired attorney Harold Scoville to sue Jack 
Tolmachoff for malicious prosecution. Scoville won. a Judgment 
in the amount of $15,000.00, which Judgment Marches assigned 
to attorney Milton Linder for collection. Linder received 
payment in full and assigned it to Grace Thomas. The Arizona 
supreme court held that Scoville had a-charging lien superior 
to Linder or Thomas because the attorney's interest, "as the 
person helping create the fund is paramount and superior to 
the rights of other persons." 333 P.2d at 289. Such is the 
majority rule and in accord with public policy. It would be 
sheer folly to enact a statute for protection against unjust 
enrichment and then allow circumvention of the statute by 
the mere transferring of the subject property. 
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Appellant has a statutory charging lien on the 
water stc: 
as proceeds of the Judgment he received as a result of the 
trial and his negotiations, in accord · 
ance W:J..th the Utah Charg; 
lien statute. The only way such a lien can be lost is by 
waiver or estoppel. Lundy vs Cappuccio, 181 P. 165 (Utah 
19
1: 
It is clear that Appellant's Motion for Summary Jud9lllent 
should have been granted because Respondents' pleadings raise 
no genuine issues as to any material fact. As discussed above 
the original Complaint merely alleges that Respondents purcha: 
the subject stock after it came into Appellant's possession by 
order of the Court in the Wareham suit. Respondents' affidav: 
in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment alleges that 
Respondents paid for the stock and instructed Appellant to 
deliver possession, that Respondents desired to sell the stock; 
and that there was no Judgment in the plaintiff's favor in 
the Wareham suit. The only allegation affecting the validit1 
of a statutory charging lien is the last one regarding a 
favorable Judgment. In spite of the language in paragraph one 
of the decree wherein the Court awards Judgment against the 
plaintiffs, examination of paragraph two reveals that in retu:: 
for the amount stipulated, the defendants were ordered to conv: 
to the plaintiff the subject water stock, as well as certa~ 
land and livestock. Certainly this Judgment was favorable in 
part to Appellant's client, ordering the defendant-vendor to 
deliver the very subject matter of both that suit and the 
present one to the plaintiff-vendee. It is clear then that 
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the favorableness of the Judgment in the wareham suit is not 
a genuine issue. The final Judgment resolves the question on 
itS very face. Therefore there are no genuine issues of fact 
alleged by Respondents which would bar the grandng of Appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, regarding the existence of a statu-
tory charging lien. Appellant's statutory charging lien at-
tached to the Wareham cause of action and to the Judgment 
rendered, favorable in part to Appellant's clients, the plaintiffs. 
said lien also attaches to the water stock as proceeds of the 
Judgment in whosoever hands that stock may come. Thus Appellant • s 
statutory charging lien would have been valid against the stock 
even if Appellant had relinquished possession. 
Appellant also has a common law retaining lien on the water 
stock in his possession. That the charging lien statute 
was not intended to supplant the common law retaining lien is 
obvious from an examination of the consequences of such a 
holding. The charging lien statute has been narrowly drafted 
to protect only litigants' attorneys who make affirmative 
pleadings, as discussed above, and such lien attaches only to 
Judgment etc. from that litigation. If that were the exclusive 
protection an attorney had, he would have to render most of his 
services without the availability of recourse to an attorney's 
lien to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of an unpaying 
client. It is for this reason that this Court was careful to 
preserve the retaining lien in Midvale Motors discussed above. 
The other state courts which have dealt with this issue have 
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likewise decided that their resPective h 
- c. arging lien statut 
e. 
do not affect retaining liens at common law. See 120 A.L.R, 
at p. 1247. 
POINT 3 
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING 
RESPONDEN'7S ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENYING 
APPELLANT S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEm', BECAUSE RE-
SPONDENTS FAILED TO RESPOND TO APPELI.A.."'T' 'S MOTION FOR 
SUMM.ARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 56(e) OF THE tJTAa 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
Appellant is entitled to Summary Judgment because the 
Respondents failed to answer Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Rule 56(e) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provic: 
in part as follows: 
"When a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supporte: 
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, bu: 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so 
respond, Summary Judgment, if appropriate, shall be ente: 
against him." 
The rule specifically provides that an adverse party 
must respond to a Motion for Summary Judgment, or else Summar, 
Judgment must be entered against him. It is not enough to 
rest upon pleadings made up to the filing of the Motion fqr 
Summary Judgment. The Motion for Summary Judgment itself mus: 
be confronted and specifically dealt with. 
The Eighth circuit faced this issue in Jacobson vs Maryla:. 
casualty co. 336 F.2d 72 (1964). Maryland as surety filed 
· · d 't I the action for losses allegedly suffered on certa~n ~n ~lY 
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agreements insuring Jacobson's perfo~~-ce of 
~u .... , government con-
tracts. In Februa~z 1960, Maryland requested admissions, 
and in June 1960, Jacobson filed an Answer. Maryland moved 
for Summary Judgment in October 1960, supporting its Motion with 
"Suggestions in Support" and in February of 1961 Jacobson filed 
an amended Answer and an affirmative defense. Ma.-yland's 
Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in t par in March 1961, 
and in October of 1962, Jacobson moved for summary Judgment, 
with "Suggestions in Support", which Motion was denied in 
December 1962, at which time Judgment was rendered in favor 
of Maryland. 
The EighthCircuit reversed the Judgment, holding that 
Maryland had never answered Jacobson's affirmative defense 
asserted in February of 1961. In discussing Rule 56(e) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, -..rhich is identical to 
utah's Rule 56(e), the Court stated: 
"Maryland also contends that the assertions made in 
support of its Motion must be taken as true but ma~es 
no counter assertions with respect to Jacobson's 
affirmative defense. The assertions in the Motion 
are meaningless unless supported as provided for in 
Rule 56(e) • True, the moving party may pierce the 
counter allegations contained in his opponent's plead-
ings, but in order to do so, he must discharge his 
burden and show by extraneous material that there is 
no triable issue of fact although one superficially 
appears from the pleadings. The record ~s devoid ~f 
anything contravening Jacobson's allegat~on of aff~rm­
ative defense. It was not Jacobson's obligation, 
but Maryland's, to produce the necessary extraneous 
material to expose this defense as unmerited. 
In,spite of the protracted pleadings, requests for admissions, 
and motions lasting for nearly two years, a specific response 
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to Jacobson's affirmative defense was 
necessary, and Jud~ 
:.ouent 
was reversed for lack of such a specific response. so a~o 
in the present case, Appellant set forth an attorney's lien 
as an affirmative defense in his Answer and again asserted 
said lien in his affidavit in support of his Motion for 5~ 
Judgment. Respondents' sole confrontation came in Resnond 
• ent; 
affidavit in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment 
, mac. 
prior to Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that 
affidavit Respondents merely assert that Appellant did not 
obtain a Judgment in his client's favor in the Wareham suit, 
a contrary conclusion to which is indisputable upon the vecy 
face of said Judgment. Furthermore, this assertion came ~ 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and therefore cannot 
be considered a response to said Motion as required by Rule 
S6(e}, and the assertion does not controvert Appellant's 
common law retaining lien in any way. 
Rule 56(e) demands a specific response to an opponent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Respondents have failed to 
make any response whatsoever. Absent such a response the 
Motion must be granted, unless a 56(£) affidavit is filed 
stating that the party cannot respond to the Motion and settiDS, 
forth specifc reasons therefore. No such affidavit was filed: 
the present case. 
In Kaz Manufacturing co. vs Chesebrough-Pond' s Inc., 211 
F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y., 1962) the Court states: 
I 
l 
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"The proponent of a Motion for s 
the burden of satisfying the Cou~tJ~?gmeni has 
~~=s~~~~:; di~~ute as 1to q~estions of fa~~r~ai=e~oby the obli atio nverse y, tne opponent to prevail has 
issues oi rel~v~tsi~~=l~ ~dllprFecsisely r8alising triable 
• . upp. 5 at 820. 
In other words, the opponent to a Motion for summary 
JUdgment has the burden of "squarely and i 1 " prec se y setting 
forth material facts which are at issue. If every fact in 
Respondents' pleadings were taken as true, a retaining lien 
would still exist, and there would be no material fact at 
issue. 
Even if Responden~had responded to Appellant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, it is nevertheless clear from the 
wareham Judgment that the favorableness to Appellant's clients 
of paragraph 2 of that Judgment is not a genuine issue of fact, 
and therefore Respondents have not responded to Appellant's 
charging lien defense. 
A similar interpretation of Rule 56(e) was reached in 
Gates vs Ford Motor co. 494 F.2d 458 (lOth Cir., 1974). In 
that case defendant moved for Summary Judgment where plaintiff 
had alleged that defendant's faulty design of its tractor was 
the cause of its overturning and killing plaintiff's husband. 
Plaintiff did not establish breach of duty, and in discussing 
the propriety of Summary Judgment, the Court said, 
"Disposition of this case by Summary Judgment also is 
proper under Rule 56(e). Appellee supported its Motion 
for sunnnary Judgment with documents. Under the circum-
stances, the party opposing the M~ion may not rest upon 
the mere allegations of his plead~ng but must respond 
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with specific facts showing a genuine J.'ssue f 
A ll , or trial ppe ant, nowever, failed to do this." 494 · 
F. 2d at 46C. 
Respondents moved for SIJIIl!Ilary Judgment on April 25, 
1977
. 
and Appellant responded with written objections on May 6 , 197. 
in compliance with Rule 56(e). Appellant also moved for Sul!i· 
mary Judgment in his favor on May 6th, thus obligating R 
esP<lnc 
ents to comply with Rule 56(e) and specifically confront Ap. 
pellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Respondents' prior 
pleadings and affidavits are insufficient~ an objection to 
Appellant's Motion is required. 
Respondents failed to file any type of answer to Appella.~: 
Motion, and, in accordance with Rule 56(e): "If he does not 
so respond, Summary Jqdgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him." 
Clearly summary Judgment is appropriate in this case 
because of Respondents' failure to raise any genuine issues 
as to material facts regarding the validity of a common law 
retaining lien and a statutory charging lien. Therefore 
Respondents failed to comply with Rule 56(e) and Summary 
Judgment in Appellant's favor must be granted. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Appellant has done all within his power ~d 
all necessary not only to create a common law retaining lien, 
but also to comply with the charging lien statute. He has 
retained possession of 
or moneys," namely the 
"property, documents, securities, papers 
water stock, as ,.curity for payment 'i 
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valuable legal services. He therefore has a common law retain-
ing lien. In addition, he has a charging lien under Utah Code 
Anno., Sec. 78-51-41 (1953 as amended). The water stock is 
proceeds of the Judgment directing the defendant in the wareham 
case to convey that stock to Appellant's client. As the plain-
tiff's attorney in the Wareham suit, Appellant had a lien on 
the cause of action, which lien attached to the Judgment 
rendered, and the water stock as proceeds thereof. 
Examination of plaintiffs_' pleadings and affidavits show 
that a lien would be attached to the water stock even if all 
the pleadings and affidavits were true. Therefore, Appellant 
is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law. Also, 
Respondents failed to respond to Appellant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment, as required by Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of 
civil Procedure, thus requiring that Appellant's Motion be 
granted. 
Appellant prays that the granting of Respondents' Motion 
for summary JUdgment be reversed as improvidently granted 
and that the lower Court be directed to enter summary Judgment 
in favor of the Appellant. 
DATED this / ~?-t(: day of September, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MICHAEL R. JENSEN 
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen 
Professional Building 
90 West lst North 
Price, Utah 84501 
Attorneys for Appellant 
- I ; i . 
BY. I I I 
v MICHAEL R. JENSEN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellant's Brief 
was served on counsel for the Respondents, Boyd Bunnell by 
delivering three (3) copies thereof to his office at Oliveto 
Building, Price, Utah 64501 on the __ ~~----~day of September, 
1977. 
I 
\ 
I 
l 
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